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GREAT POWER POLITICS AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW
Symposium on Great Power Politics & International Law
Chicago Journal of International Law
Daniel Abebe†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Should courts consider great power politics in determining the
allocation of foreign relations law authority? Foreign relations law is a set of
rules serving as an internal constraint on the unilateral exercise of foreign
relations powers through the distribution of authority within the national
government. Given the predominance of the executive branch in foreign
affairs, courts routinely consider foreign relations law questions about the
breadth of the executive’s decisionmaking authority. In resolving these
questions, courts look to legal precedent, historical practice and functional
concerns for guidance. In essence, courts look to solely internal, domestic
factors to determine the extent of foreign relations law constraints on the
executive.
But the natural focus on internal constraints obscures the increasing
importance of external constraints on the executive’s exercise of authority.
One cannot determine the overall level of constraints on the executive without
understanding the relationship between internal constraints produced by
foreign relations law and external constraints generated by great power
politics. To understand this relationship, this symposium article frames
foreign relations law as a function of great power politics, discusses the impact
of external constraints on executive decisionmaking, and offers a skeletal
theory on the salience of great power politics on the allocation of foreign
relations law authority. How is great power politics relevant to answer
presumably wholly domestic foreign relations law questions? Consider the
following example.
Imagine a state with an over two hundred year-old constitution
resting on a theory of separation of powers and providing a tripartite allocation
of foreign relations law powers. The initial allocation to the legislative,
executive and judicial branches is short and incomplete, leaving many
questions regarding the proper constitutional allocation to subsequent political
and judicial resolution. Imagine further that the institutional power and
influence of one branch—the executive—has grown dramatically since the
†
Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Tom Ginsburg,
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initial allocation, often resulting in the judicial deference to the executive on
foreign relations questions because of historical practice, institutional
competence, and greater political accountability. If the legislative branch of
this state generally follows the executive as well, and the executive has
institutional advantages in generating political support for its policies, it could
then act in many instances with significant independence from domestic
constitutional constraints.
Now one might pause to ask if this particular allocation of foreign
relations law authority is problematic. Some might favor stronger internal
constraints on executive authority, others weaker. For many, the debate stops
here. But this provides only a partial picture of the breadth of executive
power. While there is some “optimal” amount of executive branch authority—
something more than zero but less than complete authority—it cannot be
determined solely by reference to the internal constraints discussed above. We
must turn to examining the strength of external constraints for the complete
picture.
Our hypothetical state might pursue its interests in a world with two
or more competing states of similar economic and military strength—a
multipolar world with other great powers. In pursuing their national interests,
these other great powers serve as external constraints on the executive; they
represent an external disciplining force to moderate the executive’s foreign
relations decisionmaking. The executive must account for the interests of
competing great powers and the costs they could impose. Therefore, internal
constraints from foreign relations law are supported by the strength of external
constraints from great power politics. The overall level of constraints on the
executive is high.
But what happens if our state has the same allocation of foreign
relations law authority—with significant judicial deference to the executive—
and is also the hegemon of the international system? By definition, the other
powerful states are significantly weaker than our state. If so, those states may
no longer serve as a meaningful external constraint on the executive’s
decisionmaking, leaving the executive with significant freedom from both
internal and external constraints. In this unipolar world, the executive will
certainly have a greater capacity for unilateral action. The overall level of
constraints on the executive is lower because the external constraints are
weaker. In both examples, the overall quality of constraints on executive
decisionmaking is a function of the strength of internal and external factors.
It is probably clear that the hypothetical state is the United States and
the description roughly reflects the American foreign relations law allocation
of decisionmaking authority. The purpose of this article is neither to reassign
specific foreign relations law powers to certain branches nor set the optimal
level of executive authority. I am agnostic on these issues. Rather, I aim to
move the focus away from a doctrinal analysis of legal rules to consider the
overall breadth of executive authority through a lens of internal and external
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constraints. Part II develops a simple theory of the relationship between great
power politics and the allocation of decisionmaking authority. Part III touches
on the complicated issues that emerge from considering great power politics in
resolving domestic foreign relations law questions. Part IV concludes with a
discussion the implications of the theory for thinking about the convergence of
American politics, foreign relations law and U.S. foreign policy.
II. LINKING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW TO GREAT POWER POLITICS
The phrase “great power politics” generally evokes images of the
powerful nations of the world competing to maximize wealth, territory and
military influence across the globe; in international relations theory terms, it
refers to the pursuit of material power by powerful states in the international
system to achieve security. But its contemporary meaning is broader than that.
The issues relevant to the great powers also extend to dealing with the threats
of non-state actors and failed states, and the self-interested competition to
shape the content, breadth and reach of international law. However this
conception, for some, collides with the view of international law as a
mechanism to encourage cooperation and promote international order. As the
challenges of global interdependence grow—international terrorism,
environmental degradation, financial regulation and human trafficking—the
demand for coordinated solutions through international mechanisms also
grows. International institutions, in this view, are the fora for states to address
these issues and international law is the tool to implement solutions and
regulate state compliance. In either understanding of the phrase, the focus is
on the effects of great power politics along the international dimension.
Though important, the narrow focus on interstate relations masks the
important relationship between great power politics and the allocation of
foreign relations authority. In the following section, I briefly discuss the
structure of U.S. foreign relations law as a system of internal constraints on the
executive’s decisionmaking authority.
A. Foreign Relations Law as Internal Constraint
The Constitution of the United States provides the initial allocation of
foreign relations law powers among the different branches of the national
government. The Constitution grants Congress the majority of foreign
relations law decisionmaking authority in Article I, including the power to
declare war,1 raise and support an army,2 and define and punish offenses
against the law of nations.3 In Article II, the President has a narrower grant of
independent authority—the Commander in Chief Clause4 and the Take Care
Clause5—and shares concurrent authority Congress regarding the making of
treaties and appointment of ambassadors. Finally, Article III provides the
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 10
4
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
5
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
2
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federal courts with jurisdiction over cases arising out of treaties or affecting
ambassadors, federal statutes touching upon foreign relations law concerns,
and diversity disputes.6 From a historical standpoint, the Constitution’s
allocation was influenced alternatively by the structural and political failings
of the Continental Congress; the underlying theory of checks and balances in
government; the parochial interests of the several states; the international
political challenges of the young United States in the late 18th century; and the
legacy of the English legal system. But, as the United States attempted to
engage in international politics, it became clear that the initial constitutional
allocation was neither comprehensive nor determinative, particularly with
respect to the executive’s decisionmaking authority.
For example, Article II has few enumerated grants but included
general grants that lack a clear definition. How broad is the Vesting Clause?7
How should we understand the Commander in Chief Clause?8 The
Constitution enumerated certain concurrent powers—the Treaty Power—that
created a procedure for making treaties without providing guidance on treaty
termination. Can the President terminate a treaty without congressional
approval? Several seemingly important questions regarding the President’s
power to determine U.S. foreign policy, commit the U.S. to war without a
congressional declaration, acquire territory, sign executive agreements were
left unanswered in the initial allocation. The constitutional design of foreign
relations powers was not based solely on the optimal allocation of executive
authority; rather the allocation reflected the balance of competing institutional,
theoretical and functional factors at a particular historical moment.
Against this background, courts have attempted to resolve some
foreign relations law questions for which there are no clear constitutional
grants. They have generally considered both the theoretical basis of the
Constitution’s initial allocation and the functional consequences of distributing
decisionmaking authority to one branch over another. They have looked to the
underlying intent of the Framers, the sources of the national government’s
foreign relations authority, and prudential separation of powers concerns. The
evaluation of constitutional theory has been supplemented, over time, with
functional considerations: an examination of historical practice, institutional
competencies and political accountability. Despite judicial attention to both
types of concerns, they are not dispositive for the resolution of all foreign
relations law questions; rather, they are somewhat indeterminate as there is no
clear metric to weigh one concern over another. How broadly should courts
frame implied powers drawn from the Constitution’s textual grants? Should
functional concerns—institutional competencies or historical practice—trump
underlying theoretical separation of powers considerations? Should functional
concerns circumvent textual grants of power?
Like other areas of
constitutional law, courts are left to use competing interpretive methods to
6

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1
8
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
7
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determine the intent of the framers, read implied powers from enumerated
grants, weigh functional concerns against formal grants, defer to the
institutionally competent political branches and, of course, consider the
institutional, political and foreign policy consequences of their decisions.
This process occurs under the shadow of the general growth of
executive power in foreign relations. As the assumed representative of the
United States in international politics the executive has, gradually and
incrementally, assumed many of the powers necessary for governance despite
often lacking a clear textual grant of authority. For example, the executive has
taken the predominant role in formulating American foreign policy,
determining the U.S.’s position on customary international law, terminating
treaties, and committing the U.S. to international institutions, all without
specific Article II textual grants. Simultaneously, courts have developed
various prudential tools—the political question doctrine, the act of state
doctrine, and comity doctrines, among others—that result in high levels of
deference to the executive. If Congress tends to follow the executive on most
foreign relations questions, the contemporary breadth of executive power has
far surpassed the initial constitutional allocation. Combined with the growth
of the administrative state and federal power generally, foreign relations law
operates as a set of rules to govern the executive’s exercise of decisionmaking
authority. Since the executive is generally the “first mover” on foreign
relations questions, the domestic set of rules applied and interpreted by the
courts are internal constraints on executive decisionmaking.9
What should we think of these constraints? Some argue that
deference to the executive based on its significant functional advantages, with
limited judicial review, is always preferred.10 Others counter that this is at
odds with the initial constitutional allocation and separation of powers,
resulting in a potentially dangerous concentration of power in one branch, and

9

Some might argue that framing foreign relations law as a set of constraints on executive
decisionmaking is inaccurate as it could also be conceptualized alternatively as a system of rules
to empower each coordinate branch in specified issue areas or effectuate an underlying separation
of powers theory of governance. While those readings are certainly defensible as a theoretical
matter, as a practical matter the dramatic increase of executive power in foreign relations law over
the last two hundred years years—far beyond the Constitution’s textual allocation—and the
executive’s primacy in exercising foreign relations authority suggest that the rules operate, in their
current form, to either empower or limit executive decisionmaking. That the application of these
rules by courts is inconsistent and varies based on theoretical and functional considerations does
not reject the executive’s institutional dominance in foreign relations. Against this background, in
many areas foreign relations law operates as a constraint on the executive’s exercise of
decisionmaking authority.
10

See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170 (2007). For arguments that high levels of deference to the executive in times of crisis or
emergencies is appropriate see generally, ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMUELE, TERROR IN THE
BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS (2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE
PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
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argue for greater judicial review of executive decisionmaking.11 Which view
is optimal? Whatever we think of executive power, the answers to this
question cannot be determined by examining internal constraints drawn from
legal precedent and historical practice. Such a picture would be incomplete
because it fails to consider external constraints generated by great power
politics. Only after considering both types of constraints can we begin to
understand the overall level of constraints on executive authority and perhaps
move closer to determining the optimal allocation.
B. Great Power Politics as External Constraint
How are great power politics and foreign relations law linked? As I
defined it earlier, the phrase great power politics represents the competition
among the most powerful states to influence international politics, pursue their
national interests and shape the content of international law. It assumes that
states are self-interested and concerned with power.12
Despite the
heterogeneity of national interests, power often enables the achievement of
both pragmatic and normative state goals and power relationships among great
powers still play a significant role in explaining state behavior. While power
is clearly not the only factor, it is certainly relevant in international politics.
The presence of competing great powers is a constraint on state
decisionmaking. Let’s assume that we live in a multipolar world with four
great powers of comparable military and economic strength—Countries A, B,
and C and the United States. These great powers pursue their national
interests, most prominently seeking security through power but perhaps also
spreading democracy, promoting human rights, and developing international
law. Beyond thinking about power, the national interests of these great powers
will likely vary according to their internal politics, normative aspirations,
geopolitics, national history, nationalism, culture, demographics or resource
endowment, among other things.
Naturally, in a world with tremendous heterogeneity among states,
finite resources and competing national interests, we might expect to see some
friction as great powers interact in pursuit of their respective foreign policy
goals. The United States may not be able to realize a particular foreign policy
goal because it recognizes that Countries A and B have strong competing
interests. The United States might conclude that the benefit from achieving
the foreign policy goal may be outweighed by the costs that Countries A and B
11
See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1230 (2007); see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
12
Realism is the most prominent international relations theory focusing on power. See generally,
JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001); KENNETH N. WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). It is important to state clearly that one does not
have to accept all aspects of realism to understand its potential in linking great power politics to
foreign relations law. Though there is much debate within international relations about the
importance of power in international politics, even those who might question realist theory do not
assert that power never matters.

December 2008

Great Power Politics

8

could impose. Similarly, Country C may not pursue some of its goals for fear
of antagonizing another great power. In this environment, each great power is
circumscribed in shaping its foreign policy goals and determining the
mechanisms to achieve them by the presence of competing great powers. The
inevitable frictions of great power politics limit foreign policy goals by
imposing costs on the various state actors. Those costs serve as external
constraints on a state’s foreign relations law decisionmaking.
Focusing on the United States, in this example the executive would
operate under a system of internal foreign relations law constraints and
external great power politics constraints. Even if internal constraints are weak,
executive authority is still limited by the strength of external constraints.
Judicial deference to the executive, for some, might not be a problem when the
executive’s capacity to act unilaterally is restricted by the costs imposed by
great power politics. By viewing the complete picture of constraints, we have
a better understanding of the true breadth of executive authority.
Starting with the previous example and holding the internal
constraints constant, let’s assume that one of our four countries—the United
States—grows in material power by developing a huge economy and large
military projection capacity. This gap may have arisen because of better
economic policies, technological advancement, improvements in worker
productivity or, in some cases, because of the internal economic or political
problems of the other competing great powers. Whatever the reason, the
United States has gained in relative power vis-à-vis Countries A, B, and C.
Since the U.S.’s growth far outpaces that of the formerly comparable great
powers, the United States is now a superpower. The formerly multipolar
international system with four comparable great powers is now a unipolar
system, with one great power: the United States.
As the new hegemon, the United States has a much greater capacity
to pursue its national interests and expand its foreign policy goals. Why? The
potential for friction with competing great powers and attendant costs for the
United States dissipate in a unipolar world. The cost/benefit analysis for the
United States changes: the benefits from realizing a particular foreign policy
goal might now outweigh the potential costs of friction with weaker great
powers. The United States could pursue foreign policy goals in the unipolar
world that would have been much more difficult in the multipolar world
described above. Most importantly, the weak internal constraints on the
executive are compounded by the weak external constraints from great power
politics. The overall picture suggests that the executive has much greater
freedom from both types of constraints on its decisionmaking authority.
As we can see, foreign relations law is a set of internal constraints on
executive authority. But this is not the only type of constraint. Great power
politics also generate external constraints. If courts want to determine the
overall level of constraint accurately, they must include both types of
constraints in their calculus. Though simplistic, framing foreign relations law
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and great power politics as mutually reinforcing constraints on executive
decisionmaking suggests that the “optimal” allocation of authority—whatever
it is—will likely reflect a combination of internal and external factors.
C. Impact of Great Power Politics on Foreign Relations Law
What does great power politics tell us about the allocation of
decisionmaking authority? In bipolar and multipolar worlds (two or more
great powers), we know that there is no single hegemon and that the great
powers will inevitably compete in pursue their interests. Given the likelihood
for friction among them, the external constraints on great powers are stronger
as each great power must compete with the other great powers powers—
whether friend or foe—to achieve its national interests. The presence of
competing great powers makes the achievement of foreign policy goals more
difficult in a multipolar or bipolar world.
In the first example above, the United States and Countries A, B, and
C are comparable great powers in a multipolar world. The external constraints
on the United States are stronger, hindering both the executive’s capacity to
act and U.S.’s ability to achieve certain foreign policy goals. Therefore, in
resolving foreign relations law questions about the internal allocation
decisionmaking authority, courts should consider the strength of external
constraints on executive authority. Why? By failing to include the strong
external constraints in their constraint calculus, courts might systematically err
in calibrating the appropriate level of internal and overall constraints on
executive decisionmaking.
But, as the theory suggests, the shift from a multipolar to a unipolar
world naturally require a reassessment of the overall level of constraints. If
the United States is the hegemon in a unipolar world, the external constraints
created by great power politics are significantly weaker. The United States
has greater freedom of action in the international sphere. Now, in determining
the optimal level of constraints, courts should include the weakness of external
constraints in their calculus. In fact, since courts cannot control the strength of
the external constraints, it becomes even more important to calibrate properly
the internal foreign relations law constraints on executive decisionmaking.
The skeletal theory offered here to analyze the relationship between
great power politics and foreign relations law suggests a broader point: the
optimal allocation of foreign relations law power, whether it consists of high
levels of judicial deference or increased judicial review of executive
decisionmaking, probably cannot be determined solely by examining the
internal constraints within a state. I make no claim about what the optimal
level of constraint should be; rather I demonstrate that determining the optimal
level also requires consideration of external constraints. The theory leads to
the conclusion that the optimal overall level of constraint should vary across
time as the strength of external constraints varies. Analyses of the intent of
the Framers, two-hundred years of historical practice and legal precedent on
foreign relations questions will undoubtedly reflect the domestic debates and
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international politics of specific historical moments rather than the optimal
allocation for contemporary challenges. Though such analyses can be helpful,
they are unlikely to improve the allocation of decisionmaking authority today
if they are not understood as reflections of a unique historical context. It does
not make sense to defer to historical practice and precedent when the strength
of external constraints has dramatically changed.
III. GREAT POWER POLITICS AS FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW?
Given the short symposium structure, the theory developed here
necessarily lacks nuance and leaves several important theoretical and practical
questions unanswered. In the space remaining, I will focus on the logic of
using international relations theory assumptions to understand the internal
allocation of foreign relations law authority.
A. Courts and International Relations Theory
Endorsing the integration of international relation theory assumptions
into foreign relations law necessarily assumes that the judiciary can understand
the implications of great power politics in resolving legal issues. Can courts
evaluate great power politics, measure the strength of external constraints and
calibrate the overall level of constraints accordingly? This is certainly a
question that cannot be answered within the confines of this short article.
However, it is clear that judges are implicitly using international relations
theory assumptions in resolving many foreign relations law questions, and
they are doing so often without a framework or theory about state behavior in
international politics. Foreign relations law questions about the integration of
customary international law (CIL) into the American legal system13 or the
domestic enforcement of decisions by international judicial bodies,14 for
example, implicate underlying theoretical assumptions about the formation
and development of CIL15; the U.S.’s contribution to its content; and the effect
of strategic non-compliance on American foreign policy interests. Judges are
not necessarily making foreign policy; rather, their decisions strengthen or
weaken the internal constraints on the executive’s formulation and execution
of foreign policy. And if international relations theory assumptions are
actually driving some foreign relations decisions, courts should have a clearer
grasp of the relationship between internal legal constraints and external great
power politics constraints.
B. Scope of Claim
The application of great power politics to foreign relations law
naturally leads to questions about the scope of my claim. Does the theory
apply to all aspects of foreign relations law? Let me respond by stating what
13

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___ (2008).
15
For a discussion of the underlying international relations theory assumptions see, Daniel Abebe,
Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and International Human
Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. L. INT’L L.1(2007)
14
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my theory cannot do. Since the theory of external constraints focuses on
broader questions of great power politics, it does not purport to determine the
appropriate resolution for the technical questions of foreign relations law. For
example, the theory will not adequately guide courts on whether a
congressional authorization for the use of military force should be read as
permitting military tribunals or whether the procedural protections for
detainees meet constitutionally required due process standards. Inferences
drawn from the machinations of great power politics are unlikely to result in
determinative resolutions of such questions. Rather, the theory will be more
helpful with foreign relations law questions that directly implicate the extent
of the executive’s decisionmaking authority: the limitations on the exercise of
the president’s independent military powers; the breadth of Article II’s textual
grants; the level of judicial deference to executive determinations, the
unilateral termination of defense-related treaties by the executive; the nature of
U.S. participation in international judicial tribunals or international
institutions; and the weight of historical practice and functional considerations
in resolving foreign relations law questions. Great power politics is more
likely to influence the resolution of questions about the level of constraints on
executive authority rather than the narrower technical interpretations of
foreign relations law precedent.
IV. CONCLUSION: AMERICAN POLITICS, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW &
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
This brief symposium article explored the salience of great power
politics on the allocation of foreign relations law decisionmaking authority.
Although the skeletal theory proposed here is tentative, it suggests that great
power politics produces certain external constraints on executive authority that
interact with the internal constraints that foreign relations law provides.
Whatever one’s view on the optimal level of constraint on the executive, it
cannot be determined without reference to both internal and external
constraints. Since the strength of external constraints will continue to evolve,
the optimal overall level of constraints will evolve as well; therefore, the
Constitution’s initial textual grants, the development of legal precedent and the
sweep of historical practice will be helpful to the extent that courts interpret
them in light of the international political environment and the relevant
historical context. By examining the interaction of great power politics and
foreign relations law and framing them as potentially complementary systems
of constraints, the theory also leads to potentially fruitful avenues of thought
on the convergence of American politics, foreign relations law and
international relations theory.
If the structure of the international system—great power politics—
should be considered in understanding the optimal foreign relations law
allocation, it could be argued that the structure of the coordinate branches—
domestic institutional politics—is also relevant in thinking about foreign
relations law. While scholars have certainly thought about these questions on
functional lines with respect to the institutional competencies of the coordinate
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branches, it may be fruitful to examine whether institutional cultures or norms
generate consistent outcomes on foreign relations law issues. For example,
does the organizational structure, decisionmaking processes or political
incentives of each branch lead to specific perspectives on foreign relations law
or international law more broadly? Is the executive branch, regardless of the
political affiliation of its occupant, likely to privilege systematically material
power and national security concerns over those associated with legitimacy,
social norms and CIL? Conversely, is the judiciary more likely to interpret
treaty terms expansively, view CIL as binding law rather than products of
politics or encourage the greater integration of CIL into the domestic legal
system? Although these are crude dichotomies, understanding the institutional
predisposition of the coordinate branches may be relevant for optimizing the
allocation of foreign relations law powers.
The very allocation of
decisionmaking authority to one branch over another may be dispositive for
the resolution of some issues, particularly if there is empirical evidence that
the branches are predisposed to approach foreign relations law questions from
competing perspectives.16
Perhaps more controversially, this approach will naturally require
courts to engage in a more open and explicit discussion of international
politics to resolve some foreign relations law questions. In an interdependent
world, the allocation of foreign relations law authority will increasingly shape
the nature, type and breadth of the U.S.’s foreign policy behavior and
engagement with international law and international institutions. The
underlying policy preferences that occasionally drive judicial decisions—often
resulting in tortured logic and inconsistent legal outcomes—should be
revealed and discussed within a framework for thinking about international
politics. The rise of global governance in the social, political and economic
aspects of state life; the greater harmonization of legal rules; and the continued
salience of international institutions as tools of international politics blur the
distinctions between international politics, American foreign policy and
foreign relations law questions. The convergence is imminent but perhaps our
thinking about the allocation and interpretation of foreign relations law rules
has not quite kept pace.
Finally, the theory hints at a comparative foreign relations law
application. Not only does the theory suggest that the optimal allocation
should vary across time within a state, but it also implies that the optimal
allocation should vary across states. Even for states with similar governance
systems, the heterogeneity in historical experience, geostrategic importance,
military power, economic wealth and demographics suggests that the optimal
16

Though this is certainly beyond the scope of this short article, the theory implies that deference
to the executive on some foreign affairs questions, for example, might encourage certain types of
policies while a greater role for the judiciary might encourage a different set of priorities.
Developing this proposition will require an underlying theory about the nature of the different
branches.
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allocation, if it can be determined, should naturally vary in accordance with
the challenges that a state faces. Democracies, for example, differ on certain
fundamental constitutional questions—reproductive rights, the death penalty,
and gay rights for example—based on the characteristics of their cultural, legal
and political histories; it is unclear why we should not see differences in the
optimal allocation of decisionmaking authority in foreign relations law as well.
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